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Abstract
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) has found success in settings like
poker which have both terminal states and perfect recall. We seek to understand
how to relax these requirements. As a first step, we introduce a simple algorithm,
local no-regret learning (LONR), which uses a Q-learning-like update rule to al-
low learning without terminal states or perfect recall. We prove its convergence
for the basic case of MDPs (and limited extensions of them) and present empirical
results showing that it achieves last iterate convergence in a number of settings,
most notably NoSDE games, a class of Markov games specifically designed to be
challenging to learn where no prior algorithm is known to achieve convergence to
a stationary equilibrium even on average.
1 Introduction
Versions of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) [50] have found success in playing poker at
human expert level [10, 41] as well as fully solving non-trivial versions of it [8]. CFR more generally
can solve extensive form games of incomplete information. It works by using a no-regret algorithm
to select actions. In particular, one copy of such an algorithm is used at each information set, which
corresponds to the full history of play observed by a single agent. The resulting algorithm satisfies
a global no-regret guarantee, so at least in two-player zero-sum games is guaranteed to converge to
an optimal strategy through sufficient self-play.
However, CFR does have limitations. It makes two strong assumptions which are natural for games
such as poker, but limit applicability to further settings. First, it assumes that the agent has perfect
recall, which in a more general context means that the state representation captures the full history of
states visited (and so imposes a tree structure). Current RL domains may rarely repeat states due to
their large state spaces, but they certainly do not encode the full history of states and actions. Second,
it assumes that a terminal state is eventually reached and performs updates only after this occurs.
Even in episodic RL settings, which do have terminals, it may take thousands of steps to reach them.
Neither of these assumptions is required for traditional planning algorithms like value iteration or
reinforcement learning algorithms like Q-learning. Nevertheless, approaches inspired by CFR have
shown empirical promise in domains that do not necessarily satisfy these requirements [30].
In this paper, we take a step toward relaxing these assumptions. We develop a new algorithm, which
we call local no-regret learning (LONR). In the same spirit as CFR, LONR uses a copy of an arbitrary
no-regret algorithm in each state. (For technical reasons we require a slightly stronger property
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we term no-absolute-regret.) Our main result is that LONR has the same asymptotic convergence
guarantee as value iteration for discounted-reward Markov Decision Processes (MDP). Our result
also generalizes to settings where, from a single agent’s perspective, the transition process is time
invariant but rewards are not. Such settings are traditionally interpreted as “online MDPs” [17, 39,
49, 38], but also include normal form games. We view this as a proof-of-concept for achieving CFR-
style results without requiring perfect recall or terminal states. Under stylized assumptions, we can
extend this to asynchronous value iteration and (with a weaker convergence guarantee) a version of
on-policy RL.
In our experimental results, we explore settings beyond the reach of our theoretical results. Our
primary focus is on a particular class of Markov games known as NoSDE Markov games, which
are specifically designed to be challenging for learning algorithms [51]. These are finite two agent
Markov games with no terminal states where No Stationary Deterministic Equilibria exist: all sta-
tionary equilibria are randomized. Worse, by construction Q-values do not suffice to determine the
correct equilibrium randomization. Thus, prior work has focused on designing multiagent learning
algorithms which can converge to non-stationary equilibria [51]. The sorts of cyclic behavior that
NoSDE games induce has also been observed in more realistic settings of economic competition
between agents [46].
In contrast, we demonstrate that LONR converges to the stationary equilibrium for specific choices
of regret minimizer. Furthmore, for these choices of minimizer we achieve not just convergence of
the average policy but also of the current policy, or last iterate. Thus our results are also interesting
from the perspective of highlighting a setting for the study of last iterate convergence, an area of
current interest, in between simple normal form games [40, 3] and rich, complex settings such as
generative adverarial networks (GANs) [14].
Most work on CFR uses some version of regret matching as the regret minimzer. However, all prior
variants of regret matching are known to not possess last iterate convergence in normal form games
such as matching pennies and rock-paper-scissors. As part of our analysis we introduce a novel
variant, prove that it is no-regret, and show empirically that is provides last iterate convergence in
these normal form games as well as all other settings we have tried. This may be of independent
interest, as it is qualitatively different from prior algorithms with last iterate covergence which are
optimistic versions of standard algorithms [13, 14].
2 Related work
CFR algorithms remain an active topic of research; recent work has shown how to combine it with
function approximation [48, 41, 30, 11, 36], improve the convergence rate in certain settings [19],
and apply it to more complex structures [20]. Most relevant to our work, examples are known where
CFR fails to converge to the correct policy without perfect recall [35].
Both CFR and LONR are guaranteed to converge only in terms of their average policy. This is
part of a general phenomenon for no-regret learning in games, where the “last iterate,” or current
policy, not only fails to converge but behaves in an extreme and cyclic way [40, 3, 12, 4]. Recent
work has explored cases where it is nonetheless effective to use the last iterate. In some poker
settings a variant of CFR known as CFR+ [45, 45, 8] has good last iterates, but it is known to cycle
in normal-form games. Motivated by training Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), recent
results have shown that certain no-regret algorithms converge in terms of the last iterate to saddle-
points in convex-concave min-max optimization problems [14, 13]. The ability to use the last iterate
is particularly important in the context of function approximation [27, 1]. Our experimental results
provide examples of LONR achieving last iterate convergence when the underlying regret minimizer
is capable of it.
Prior work has developed algorithms which combine no-regret and reinforcement learning, but in
ways that are qualitatively different from LONR. A common approach in the literature on multi-
agent learning is to use no-regret learning as an outer loop to optimize over the space of policies,
with the assumption that the inner loop of evaluating a policy is given to the algorithm. There is
a large literature on this approach in normal form games [24], where policy evaluation is trivial,
and a smaller one on “online MDPs” [17, 39, 49, 38], where it is less so. Of particular note in this
literature, Even-Dar, Kakade, and Mansour [16] also use the idea of having a copy of a no-regret
algorithm for each state. An alternate approach to solving multi-agent MDPs is to use Q-learning as
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an outer loop with some other algorithm as an inner loop to determine the collective action chosen
in the next state [37, 28, 25]. Of particular note, Gondek, Greenwald, and Hall [23] proposed the use
of no-regret algorithms as an inner loop with Q-learning as an outer loop while Even-Dar, Mannor,
and Mansour [18] use multi-armed bandit algorithms as the inner loop with Phased Q-learning [32]
as the outer loop. In contrast to these literatures, we combine RL in each step of the learning process
rather than having one as an inner loop and the other as an outer loop.
Recent work has drawn new connections between no-regret and RL. Srinivasan et al. [43] show
that actor-critic methods can be interpreted as a form of regret minimization, but only analyze their
performance in games with perfect recall and terminal states. This is complementary to our ap-
proach, which focuses on value-iteration-style algorithms, in that it suggests a way of extending
our results to other classes of algorithms. Neu, Jonsson, and Go´mez [42] study entropy-regularized
RL and interpret it as an approximate version of Mirror Descent, from which no-regret algorithms
can be derived as particular instantiations. Kovarˇı´k and Lisy` [33] study algorithms that instantiate
a regret minimizer at each state without the counterfactual weightings from CFR, but explicitly ex-
clude settings without terminals and perfect recall from their analysis. Jin et al. [29] showed that in
finite-horizon MDPs, Q-learning with UCB exploration achieves near-optimal regret bounds.
The closest technical approach to that used in our theoretical results is that of Bellemare et al. [6]
who introduce new variants of the Q-learning operator. However, our algorithm is not an operator
as the policy used to select actions changes from round to round in a history-dependent way, so we
instead directly analyze the sequences of Q-values.
3 Preliminaries
Consider a Markov Decision Process M = (S,A, P, r, γ), where S is the state space, A is the
(finite) action space, P : S × A → ∆(S) is the transition probability kernel, r : S × A → R is the
(expected) reward function (assumed to be bounded), and 0 < γ < 1 is the discount rate. (Q-)value
iteration is an operator T , whose domain is bounded real-valued functions over S ×A, defined as
T Q(s, a) = r(s, a) + γEP [max
a′∈A
Q(s′, a′)] (1)
This operator is a contraction map in || · ||∞, and so converges to a unique fixed point Q∗, where
Q∗(s, a) gives the expected value of the MDP starting from state s, taking action a, and thereafter
following the optimal policy pi∗(s) = arg maxa∈AQ∗(s, a).
Our algorithm makes use of a no-regret learning algorithm.2 Consider the following (adversarial
full-information) setting. There are n actions a1, . . . an. At each timestep k an online algorithm
chooses a probability distribution pik over the n actions. Then an adversary chooses a reward xk,i
for each action i from some closed interval, e.g. [0, 1], which the algorithm then observes. The
(external) regret of the algorithm at time k is
1
k + 1
max
i
k∑
t=0
xt,i − pit · xt (2)
An algorithm is no-regret if there a sequence of constants ρk such that regardless of the adversary
the regret at time k is at most ρk and limk→∞ ρk = 0. A common bound is that ρk is O(1/
√
k).
For our results, we make use of a stronger property, that the absolute value of the regret is bounded
by ρk. We call such an algorithm a no-absolute-regret algorithm. Algorithms exist that satisfy the
even stronger property that the regret is at most ρk and at least 0. Such non-negative-regret algo-
rithms include all linear cost Regularized Follow the Leader algorithms, which includes Randomized
Weighted Majority and linear cost Online Gradient Descent [22].
4 Local no-regret learning (LONR)
The idea of LONR is to fuse the essence of value iteration / Q-learning and CFR. A standard analysis
of value iteration proceeds by analyzing the sequence of matrices Q, T Q, T 2Q, T 3Q, . . .. The
2It may seem strange to use an algorithm designed for non-stationary environments in a stationary one. We
do so with the goal of designing an algorithm that generalizes to non-stationary settings such as “online” MDPs
and Markov games.
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essence of CFR is to choose the policy for each state locally using a no-regret algorithm. While
doing so does not yield an operator, as the policy changes each round in a history-dependent way,
this process still yields a sequence of Q matrices as follows.
Fix a matrix Q0. Initialize |S| copies of a no-absolute-regret algorithm (one for each state) with
n = |A| and find the initial policy pi0(s) for each state s. Then we iteratively reveal rewards to the
copy of the algorithm for state s as xsk,i = Qk(s, ai),
3 and update the policy pik+1 according to the
no-absolute-regret algorithm and Qk+1(s, a) = r(s, a) + γEP,pik [Qk(s′, a′)].
Call this process local no-regret learning (LONR). It can be viewed as a synchronous version of
Expected SARSA [47] where instead of using an -greedy policy with decaying , a no-absolute-
regret policy is used instead. In the rest of this section we work up to our main result, that LONR
converges to Q∗. Like many prior results using no-regret learning (e.g. [50]), the convergence is of
the average of the Qk matrices.
We work up to this result through a series of lemmas. To begin, we derive a bound on the on average
of Q values using the no-absolute-regret property. We use two slightly different averages to be able
to relate them using the T operator.
Lemma 1. Let Qk = 1/k
∑k
t=1Qt and Qk = 1/k
∑k−1
t=0 Qt. Then
− γρk−1 + T Qk(s, a) ≤ Qk(s, a) ≤ γρk−1 + T Qk(s, a). (3)
Proof. By the definitions of LONR and no-regret,
Qk(s, a) =
1
k
k∑
t=1
Qt(s, a)
=
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
r(s, a) + γEP,pit [Qt(s′, a′)]
= r(s, a) + γEP [
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
Epit [Qt(s′, a′)]]
≥ r(s, a) + γEP [max
i
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
Qt(s
′, ai)− ρk−1]
= −γρk−1 + r(s, a) + γEP [max
i
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
Qt(s
′, ai)]
= −γρk−1 + r(s, a) + γEP [max
i
Q
k
(s′, ai)]
= −γρk−1 + T Qk(s, a)
The key step is the inequality in the fourth line, where we use the fact that the policy for state s′
is being determined by a no-regret algorithm, so we can use Equation (2) to bound the expected
value of the policy by the value of the hindsight-optimal action and the regret bound of the algo-
rithm. Similarly, by the stronger no-absolute-regret property, we can reverse the inequality to get
Qk(s, a) ≤ γρk−1 + T Qk(s, a). This proves Equation (3).
Next, we show that the range that the Q values take on is bounded. This lemma is similar in spirit to
Lemma 2 of Bellemare et al. [6]. This and subsequent omitted proofs can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. Let ||r||∞ = maxs,a |r(s, a)|. Then ||Qk −Q0||∞ ≤ 1/(1− γ)||r||∞ + 2||Q0||∞
Combining these two lemmas, we can show that Q
k
is an approximate fixed-point of T , and that the
approximation is converging to 0 as k →∞.
3Note that we are revealing the rewards of all actions, so we are in the planning setting rather than the
standard RL one. We address settings with limited feedback in Section 5.2.
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Lemma 3. ||Q
k
− T Q
k
||∞ ≤ 1k (1/(1− γ)||r||∞ + 2||Q0||∞) + γρk−1
It remains to show that a converging sequence of approximate fixed points converges toQ∗, the fixed
point of T .
Lemma 4. Let Q0, Q1, . . . be a sequence such that limk→∞ ||Qk − T Qk||∞ = 0. Then
limk→∞Qk = Q∗.
Combining Lemmas 3 and 4 shows the convergence of LONR learning.
Theorem 1. limk→∞Qk = Q
∗.
4.1 Beyond MDPs
While our results do not rely on perfect recall or terminal states the way CFR does, so far they are
limited to the case of MDPs while CFR permits multiple agents and imperfect information. We can
straightforwardly extend our results to some settings beyond MDPs. In Appendix A we show that
a version of Lemma 1 holds in MDP-like settings where the transition probability kernel does not
change from round to round but the rewards do. Examples of such settings include “online MDPs”
and normal-form games. This last result is not particularly surprising as with a single state LONR
reduces to standard no-regret learning, whose convergence guarantees in normal-form games are
well understood. In Section 6 we present empirical results demonstrating convergence in the richer
multi-agent setting of Markov games.
5 Extensions
In this section we consider two extensions to LONR, one allowing it to be updated asynchronously
(i.e. not updating every state in every iteration) and the other allowing it to learn from asynchronous
updates with bandit feedback (i.e. the standard off-policy RL setting). This introduces novel tech-
nical issues around the performance of no-regret algorithms when their performance is assessed
on a sample taken with replacement of their rounds (rather than counting each round exactly one).
Therefore, we analyze convergence only in the simplified case where the state to update at each
iteration is chosen uniformly at random. We emphasize that this is an unreasonably strong assump-
tion in practice, and view our results in this section as providing intuition about why sufficiently
“nice” processes should converge. We demonstrate empirical convergence with in a more standard
on-policy setting in Section 6 and leave a more general theoretical analysis to future work.
5.1 Asynchronous updates
In Section 4 we analyzed an algorithm, LONR, which is similar to value iteration in that each state is
updated synchronously at each iteration. However, an alternative is to update them asynchronously,
where an arbitrary single state is updated at each iteration. Subject to suitable conditions on the
frequency with which each state is updated, asynchronous value iteration also converges [7]
A line of work has shown that CFR will also converge when sampling trajectories [34, 21, 31].
In this section, we show that LONR also converges with such asynchonous updates. However, this
introduces a new complexity to our analysis. In particular, with synchronous updates there is a
guarantee that Qk(s, a) sees exactly the first k values of each action of each of its successor states.
This allows us to immediately apply the no-regret property (2). With asynchronous updates, even if
we update all actions in a state at the same time, Qk(s, a)’s successors may have been updated more
or fewer than k times, and Qk(s, a) may have missed some of these updates and observed others
more than once, meaning we cannot directly apply (2). We prove the following Lemma to show
that a particular sampling process converges to a correct estimate of the average regret, but believe
that similar characterizations should hold for other “nice” processes. We demonstrate empirical
convergence of asynchronous LONR when states are selected in an on-policy manner in Section 6.
Lemma 5. Let t1, . . . , tk be the first k iterations at which s is updated, s′ be a succes-
sor of s, τ1, . . . , τk′ be the iterations before tk at which s′ was updated, and ξss′(k) =
1/k
∑k
i=1 EpitiQti(s
′, a)− 1/k′∑k′i=1 EpiτiQτi(s′, a). If the state to be updated at each iteration is
chosen uniformly at random then limk→∞ ξss′(k) = 0 with probability 1.
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Proof. LetXi be the number of times s is updated using τi. TheXi are i.i.d. random variables whose
law is the geometric distribution with probability 0.5. Thus, E[Xi] = 1 and by the strong law of large
numbers the sample average of the Xi converges to 1 with probability 1. Let ci = EpiτiQτi(s
′, a)
and Ci =
∑k′
i=1 ci. Then by [15, Theorem 3],
∑k′
i=1 ciXi/Ci also converges to 1 with probability
1. Equivalently, limk′→∞
∑k′
i=1 ciXi − Ci = 0 with probability 1.
With this in hand, we can now prove a result similar to Lemma 1 for asynchronous updates. The
primary difference is that now have an additional error term in the bounds, but like the term from
the regret it goes to zero per Lemma 5.
Lemma 6. Let s be the state selected uniformly at random and updated in iteration t+ 1, for which
this is the k-th update and let Qt+1(s, a) = 1/k
∑k
i=1Qti(s, a) and Qt+1(s
′, a) = Qt(s
′, a) for
s′ 6= s. Then
min
s′
γ(−ξss′(k)− ρk′) + T Qt(s, a)
≤ Qt+1(s, a) ≤ max
s′
γ(−ξss′(k) + ρk′)T Qt(s, a). (4)
It immediately follows that Qt is an approximate fixed-point of T , and that the approximation is
converging to 0 as k →∞.
Lemma 7. Let k be the minimum number of times a state has been chosen uniformly at random for
update by time t. Then ||Qt − T Qt||∞ ≤ γρk−1 + ||ξ(k)||∞
Combining Lemmas 7 and 4 (the latter of which applies without change) shows the convergence of
asynchronous LONR learning.
Theorem 2. If states are chosen for update uniformly at random limk→∞Qt = Q∗ with prob. 1.
5.2 Asynchronous updates with bandit feedback
In RL, algorithms like Q-learning are usually assumed not to know P and so only have access to
feedback corresponding to the action actually taken in the current iteration. In such settings, ordinary
no-regret algorithms are not applicable because they require the counterfactual results from actions
not chosen. However, multi-armed bandit algorithms, such as Exp3 [2], are designed to achieve
no-regret guarantees in expectation despite only receiving feedback about the outcomes chosen. It
would be natural to adapt LONR to the on-policy RL setting by replacing the no-regret algorithm
with a multi-armed bandit one. This type of result has previously been obtained for normal-form
games [5], where agents can learn to play optimally even if they only learn their payoff at each stage
and not what action the other agents took.
To adapt LONR to make use of multi-armed bandit algorithms, we can use the Q update rule
Qt+1(s, a) = 1/pit(s, a)(r(s, a) + γEpit [Qk(s′, a′)] if a is the action chosen for state s and
Qt+1(s, a
′) = 0 for a′ 6= a.4 The no-absolute-regret algorithm for bandit feedback at s can then
be updated as xst = r(s, a) + γEpit [Qk(s′, a′)]. (We use the raw rather than importance sampling
estimate here because, e.g. Exp3 already includes importance weighting.) Unlike in Q-learning, we
do not need to average over Q-values to account for the stochasticity in choice of s′ because our
convergence results are already for the averages of our Q-values.
With these definitions, Lemma 6 can be immediately adapted to this setting with the caveat that now
the guarantees only hold in expectation over the choice of action at each iteration and the resulting
state. Furthermore, since we require the state be chosen uniformly at random, the resulting algorithm
is on-policy in the sense that the algorithm is choosing which action to receive feedback about, but
does not control the sequence of states in which it acts.
Lemma 8. Let s be the state selected uniformly at random and updated in iteration t+ 1, for which
this is the k-th update and let Qt+1(s, a) = 1/k
∑k
i=1Qti(s, a) and Qt+1(s
′, a) = Qt(s
′, a) for
4The use of importance sampling here is to maintain the structure that successor states are evaluated as
Epit [Qk(s′, a′)]. Alternatively we could use the SARSA-style update Qt+1(s, a) = r(s, a) + γQt(s′, a′)
where a′ is the action that was chosen the last time s′ was updated and leave all other Q-values unchanged (this
also requires appropriately adjusting the way the average is computed).
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s′ 6= s. Then
min
s′
γ(−ξss′(k)− ρk′) + T Qt(s, a) (5)
≤ E[Qt+1(s, a)] ≤ max
s′
γ(−ξss′(k) + ρk′)T Qt(s, a).
The same analysis from the asynchronous full information case then yields the following theorem.
Theorem 3. If states are chosen for update uniformly at random, then limk→∞E[Qt] = Q∗.
This convergence of expectation implies that the Qt converge in probability to Q
∗, a weaker guar-
antee than the almost sure convergence of algorithms like Q-learning. We leave deriving a stronger
convergence guarantee with more natural assumptions about state selection to future work.
6 Experiments
Our theoretical results in Sections 4 and 5 are restricted to (online) MDPs and normal form games
and require a number of technical assumptions. The primary goal of this section is to provide
evidence that relaxation of these restrictions may be possible.
Another goal of these results is that while the theory behind LONR calls for a regret minimizer with
the no-absolute regret property, we seek to understand the performance of various well-known regret
minimizers within the LONR framework, which may or may not be no-absolute regret. One pop-
ular class of no-regret algorithms is Follow-the-Regularized Leader (FoReL) algorithms, of which
Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU) is perhaps the best known. MWU works by determining
a probability distribution over actions by normalizing weights assigned to each action, with the
weights equal to the exponential sum of past rewards and a learning rate. It satisfies the stronger
non-negative regret property and therefore the no-absolute regret property. Another algorithm we
consider is Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update (OMWU), which extends MWU with opti-
mism by making the slight adjustment of counting the last value twice each iteration, a change
which guarantees not just that the average policy is no-regret, but that the last one (the last iterate)
is as well [13]. We also consider Regret Matching [26] (RM) algorithms, which are the most widely
used regret minimizers in CFR-based algorithms due to their simplicity and, unlike FoReL, lack of
parameters. With RM, the policy distribution for iteration t + 1 is selected for actions proportional
to the accumulated positive regrets over iterations 0 to t. Regret Matching+ (RM+) is a variation
that resets negative accumulated regret sums after each iteration to zero, and applies a linear weigh-
ing term to the contributions to the average strategy [45]. The current state of the art algorithm,
Discounted CFR (DCFR), is a parameterized algorithm generalizing RM+ where the accumulated
positive and negative regrets are weighed separately as well the weight assigned to the contribution
to the average strategy [9]. The paramters used are α = 3/2, β = 0 and γ = 2, which are the values
recommended by the authors. All of these variants of RM are known to not have last iterate conver-
gence in general and to not satisfy the non-negative regret property. (We do not know whether they
satisfy the no-absolute-regret property.)
In addition to these standard no-regret algorithms, we introduce a new variant of RM called Regret
Matching++ (RM++), which updates in a similar fashion to Regret Matching but clips the instanta-
neous regrets at 0. That is, if Rt(a) is the regret of action a in round t RM tracks
∑
tR
t(a) while
RM++ tracks the upper bound
∑
t max(R
t(a), 0).5 In the appendix we prove that RM++ is in fact a
no-regret algorithm. The proof is a minor variation of the proof for RM+ [44]. We also demonstrate
that RM++ empirically has last iterate convergence in a number of settings. This may be of inde-
pendent interest as unlike OMWU it is not obviously describable as an optimistic version of another
regret minimizer.
Lastly, we present results for the first two versions of LONR we analyzed theoretically: value-
iteration style (LONR-V) and with asynchronous updates (LONR-A). For LONR-A, while the the-
ory requires states be chosen for update uniformly at random, we instead run it on policy. (We add
a small probability of a random action, 0.1, to ensure adequate exploration.) Our results show that
empirically this does not prevent convergence.
5The same idea of clipping instantaneous regrets at 0 has recently been used by actor-critic approaches [43].
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1 2
R1(2, SEND) = 0
R1(1, KEEP ) = 1 R1(2, KEEP ) = 3
R1(1, SEND) = 0
(a) Rewards for Player 1
1 2
R2(2, SEND) = 0
R2(1, KEEP ) = 0 R2(2, KEEP ) = 1
R2(1, SEND) = 3
(b) Rewards for Player 2
Figure 1: NoSDE Markov Game
The settings we use for our results are chosen to demonstrate LONR in settings where neither CFR
nor standard RL algorithms are applicable. For CFR, this means we choose settings with repeated
states and possibly a lack of terminals. For RL, this means considering settings with multiple agents.
Since our exposition of LONR is for a single agent setting, we now explain how we apply it in multi-
agent settings. We use centralized training, so each agent has access to the current policy of the other
agent. This allows the agent to update with the expected rewards and transition probabilities induced
by the current policy of the other agent.
6.1 NoSDE Markov Game
Our primary setting is a stateful one with multiple agents. Such settings are naturally modelled as
Markov games, a generalization of MDPs to multi-agent settings. A Markov Game Γ is a tuple
(S,N,A, T,R, γ) where S is the set of states, N = {1, ..., n} is the set of players, the set of all
state-action pairsA =
⋃
s∈S({s}×
∏
n∈N An,s), a transition kernel T : A 7→ ∆(S), and a discount
factor γ.
Because Markov Games can model a wide variety of games, algorithms designed for the entirety of
this class must be robust to particularly troublesome subclasses. One early negative result found that
there exist general-sum Markov Games in which no stationary deterministic equilibria exist, which
Zinkevich, Greenwald, and Littman [51] term NoSDE games. These games have the property that
there exists a unique stationary equilibrium with (randomized) policies where the Q-values for each
agent are identical in equilibrium but their equilibrium strategies are not. Furthermore, additional
complexity exists as the rewards of each player in this NoSDE game can be adjusted within a certain
closed interval, where the resulting Q-values remain the same, but the stationary policy changes,
thus making Q-value learning even more problematic.
The reward structure for the particular NoSDE game we use is shown in Figure 1a for Player 1
and Figure 1b for Player 2. Conceptually, a NoSDE game is a deterministic Markov Game with
2 players, 2 states, and each state has a single player with more than one action. The dynamics
of a NoSDE game become cyclic as each player prefers to change actions when the other player
does as well, which causes the non-stationarity. In this instance, when player 1 sends, player 2 then
prefers to send. This causes player 1 to prefer to keep, which in turn causes player 2 to prefer to
keep. Player 1 then prefers to send and the cycle repeats. Due to these negative results, Q-value
learning algorithms cannot learn the stationary equilibrium. The state of the art solution is still that
of Zinkevich, Greenwald, and Littman [51] who give a multi-agent value iteration procedure which
can approximate a cyclic (non-stationary) equilibrium.
No-regret algorithms are known to converge in self-play, but not necessarily to desirable points,
e.g. Nash Equilibrium. This convergence guarantee is in the average policy. Our first results look
at the average policies in the NoSDE game with LONR-V. Figure 2 show behavior of the average
probability with which player 1 chooses to SEND. The unique stationary equilibrium probability
for this action is 2/3. Each algorithm shows convergence, but not to the same value. Not shown but
important is that each also is converging to the equilibrium Q∗ in the average Q values.
RM and MWU converge to a similar average policy (top two lines). These two algorithms choose
based on tracking the sum of regrets and rewards respectively. RM+ and DCFR follow a similar
path (next two lines), which makes sense given that RM+ is a special case of DCFR. RM++ and
OMWU are the only two which find the stationary equilibrium policy (bottom two lines). These
two are also the only two with last iterate convergence properties (OMWU provably and RM++
empirically). Figure 3, which plots the current iterate for each regret minimizer, shows that this
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Figure 2: Average Policy for player1[Send]
holds in our NoSDE game as well. RM++ and OMWU achieve last iterate convergence while for
the other four cyclic behavior can be seen. This result highlights NoSDE games as a setting where it
would be interesting to theoretically study last iterate convergence in between simple normal form
games [40, 3] and rich, complex settings such as GANs [14].
While the theory behind OMWU states that the last value need only be counted twice, our results
highlight the difference in the last iterate when more optimism is included (i.e. the last value is
counted more than twice.) Specifically, in Figure 4a , we plot the last iterate for increasing counts of
the last value. The figure indicates the role increased optimism plays in not only convergence versus
divergence, but in how quickly convergence happens. In this case, despite the theory, counting twice
does not lead to convergence in the last iterate, but 3 and above does. Again, theoretically exploring
this phenomenon is an interesting direction for future work.
Lastly, we analyze LONR-A, the asynchronous version of LONR. We restrict our results to the two
which show last iterate convergence, RM++ (Figure 4b) and OMWU (Figure 4c), plotting 100 runs
of each. They show that, despite a more natural process for choosing which state to update than our
theory permits, we still see convergence.
6.2 Additional Experiments
Additional experiments which bridge the gap from MDPs to NoSDE Markov Games are presented
in the Appendix. For a “nicer” Markov game than our deliberately challenging NoSDE game, we
use the standard simple 2-player, zero-sum soccer game [37]. With any of our six regret minimizers
both LONR-V and LONR-A achieve approximate equilibrium payoffs on average. For a setting to
probe the assumptions of our theory in a setting closer to it, we run LONR on the typical benchmark
GridWorld environment, an MDP. Specifically we use the standard cliff-walking task which requires
the agent to avoid a high-cost cliff to reach the exit terminal state. Again, LONR-V and LONR-A
learn the optimal policy (and optimal Q-values) despite regret minimizers that may not satisfy the
no-absolute-regret property and, in the case of LONR-A, on policy state selection.
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Figure 3: Policy for player1[Send]
(a) Impact of level of opti-
mism on convergence
(b) Multiple runs of LONR-
A with RM++
(c) Multiple runs of LONR-
A with OMWU
Figure 4: Additional results for NoSDE Markov Game
7 Conclusion
We have proposed a new learning algorithm, local no-regret learning (LONR). We have shown its
convergence for the basic case of MDPs (and limited extensions of them) and presented empirical
results showing that it achieves convergence, and in some cases last iterate convergence, in a number
of settings, most notably NoSDE games. We view this as a proof-of-concept for achieving CFR-style
results without requiring perfect recall or terminal states.
Our results point to a number of interesting directions for future research. First, a natural goal given
our empirical results would be to extend our convergence results to Markov games. Second, CFR
also works in settings with partial observability by appropriately weighting the different states which
correspond to the same observed history. Third, we would like to relax the strong assumptions our
results about asynchronous updates require. All three seem to rely on the same fundamental building
block of better understanding the behavior of no-regret learners whose rewards are determined by
(asynchronous) observations of other no-regret learners. Some recent progress along these lines has
been made [20, 33], but more work is needed.
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Orthogonal directions are suggested by our empirical results about last iterate convergence. Can we
establish theoretical guarantees for NoSDEs or Markov games more broadly? Is RM++ guaranteed
to achieve last iterate convergence? It empirically does in standard games like matching pennies and
rock-paper-scissors which trip up most regret minimizers. If so does this represent a new style of
algorithm to achieve last iterate convergence or is there a way to interpret its clipping of regrets as
optimism?
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A Beyond MDPs
If we move beyond MDPs, P and r are no longer stationary and in general we have a Pk and Rk.
This causes problems with the proof of Lemma 1. Recall the initial part of that proof, updated to
this more general setting:
Qk(s, a) =
1
k
k∑
t=1
Qt(s, a)
=
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
rt(s, a) + γEPt,pit [Qt(s′, a′)]
In the original proof, we pulled the expectation over P outside the sum, but now we cannot. In
particular, writing the expectation more explicitly gives
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
rt(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
Pt(s
′ | s, a)Epit [Qt(s′, a′)] (6)
We can still reverse the order of the sums, but the weighting terms now depend on t so they cannot
be moved outside. More problematically, they also depend on s and a, so it is not immediately clear
how to generalize our results.
For intuition about the sort of problems that could arise, consider a state s′ where there are two
actions. At odd k, rk(s′, a1) = 1 and rk(s′, a2) = 0 and vice versa at even k. It is a valid no-regret
strategy to randomize uniformly over the actions, but if the Pk are such that you only arrive in s′
from s at odd k, then this gives an incorrect estimate.
In the remainder of this section, we analyze a special case where we can prove a variant of Lemma 1.
A.1 Time-invariant P
If P does not change with k, but r does, we can still prove a version of Lemma 1. With a single
state, this captures learning in normal-form games, where no-regret learning is indeed known to
work. This assumption is also common in the literature on “online MDPs” [17, 39, 49, 38] In this
setting, a version of Lemma 1 can be proved, but now rather than having a constant operator T it
now changes over time as
TkQ(s, a) = rk(s, a) + γEP [max
i
Q(s′, ai)]. (7)
Lemma 9.
− γρk−1 + TkQk(s, a) ≤ Qk(s, a) ≤ γρk−1 + TkQk(s, a). (8)
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Proof.
Qk(s, a)
=
1
k
k∑
t=1
Qt(s, a)
=
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
rt(s, a) + γEP,pit [Qt(s′, a′)]
=
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
rt(s, a) + γEP [
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
Epit [Qt(s′, a′)]]
≥ 1
k
k−1∑
t=0
rt(s, a) + γEP [max
i
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
Qt(s
′, ai)− ρk−1]
= −γρk−1 + 1
k
k−1∑
t=0
rt(s, a) + γEP [max
i
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
Qt(s
′, ai)]
= −γρk−1 + rk(s, a) + γEP [max
i
Q
k
(s′, ai)]
= −γρk−1 + TkQk(s, a)
As before, the key step is applying the no-regret property to obtain the inequality and we apply the
same argument with the no-absolute-regret property to obtain the reverse inequality.
B Omitted Proofs
Lemma 2. Let ||r||∞ = maxs,a |r(s, a)|. Then ||Qk −Q0||∞ ≤ 1/(1− γ)||r||∞ + 2||Q0||∞
Proof. By definition, Qk(s, a) = r(s, a) + γEP,pik [Qk−1(s′, a′)]. Thus by the subadditive property
of norms, ||Qk||∞ ≤ ||r||∞+γ||Qk−1||∞. By induction, ||Qk||∞ ≤ (
∑k−1
t=0 γ
k)||r||∞+γk||Q0||∞.
Thus ||Qk −Q0||∞ ≤ ||Qk||∞ + ||Q0||∞ ≤ 1/(1− γ)||r||∞ + 2||Q0||∞.
Lemma 3. ||Q
k
− T Q
k
||∞ ≤ 1k (1/(1− γ)||r||∞ + 2||Q0||∞) + γρk−1
Proof.
||Q
k
− T Q
k
||∞
≤ ||Q
k
−Qk||∞ + ||Qk − T Qk||∞
= ||Q
k
−Qk||∞ + max
s,a
|Qk(s, a)− T Qk(s, a)|
≤ ||Q
k
−Qk||∞ + γρk−1
=
1
k
||Qk −Q0||∞ + γρk−1
≤ 1
k
(1/(1− γ)||r||∞ + 2||Q0||∞) + γρk−1
The first step follows by the subadditive property of norms, the second by definition, the third by
Lemma 1, the fourth by definition, and the fifth by Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. Let Q0, Q1, . . . be a sequence such that limk→∞ ||Qk − T Qk||∞ = 0. Then
limk→∞Qk = Q∗.
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Proof.
||Qk −Q∗||∞ ≤ ||Qk − T Qk||∞ + ||T Qk −Q∗||∞
= ||Qk − T Qk||∞ + ||T Qk − T Q∗||∞
≤ ||Qk − T Qk||∞ + γ||Qk −Q∗||∞
The first step follows by the subadditive property of norms, the second by optimality ofQ∗, the third
because T is a contraction map. Rewriting yields
||Qk −Q∗||∞ ≤ 1
1− γ ||Qk − T Qk||∞
Thus, by assumption, lim supk→∞ ||Qk−Q∗||∞ ≤ 0. Since ||Qk−Q∗||∞ ≥ 0, lim infk→∞ ||Qk−
Q∗||∞ ≥ 0. Thus limk→∞ ||Qk −Q∗||∞ = 0 and the result follows.
Lemma 6. Let s be the state selected uniformly at random and updated in iteration t+ 1, for which
this is the k-th update and let Qt+1(s, a) = 1/k
∑k
i=1Qti(s, a) and Qt+1(s
′, a) = Qt(s
′, a) for
s′ 6= s. Then
min
s′
γ(−ξss′(k)− ρk′) + T Qt(s, a)
≤ Qt+1(s, a) ≤ max
s′
γ(−ξss′(k) + ρk′)T Qt(s, a).
Proof. By the definitions of LONR and no-regret algorithms,
Qt+1(s, a)
=
1
k
k∑
i=1
Qti(s, a)
=
1
k
k∑
i=1
r(s, a) + γEP,piti [Qti(s
′, a′)]
= r(s, a) + γEP [
1
k
k∑
i=1
Epiti [Qti(s
′, a′)]]
= r(s, a) + γEP [−ξss′(k) + 1
k′
k′∑
i=1
Epiτi [Qτi(s
′, a′)]]
≥ r(s, a) + γEP [−ξss′(k) + max
a′
1
k′
k′∑
i=1
Qτi(s
′, a′)− ρk′ ]
≥ min
s′
γ(−ξss′(k)− ρk′) + r(s, a) + γEP [max
a′
1
k′
k′∑
i=1
Qτi(s
′, a′)]
= min
s′
γ(−ξss′(k)− ρk′) + r(s, a) + γEP [max
a′
Qt(s
′, a′)]
= min
s′
γ(−ξss′(k)− ρk′)T Qt(s, a′)]
This argument is essentially the same as in the proof of Lemma 1, except that in the fourth equality
we apply the definition of ξ to yield a form to which we can then apply the no-regret property. As
before, the other half of the proof is symmetric and uses the no-absolute-regret property.
C Regret Matching++
In this section, we prove that RM++ is a no-regret algorithm and then demonstrate that it has empir-
ical last iterate convergence.
15
Lemma 10. Given a sequence of strategies σ1, ..., σT , each defining a probability distribution over
a set of actions A, consider any definition for Qt(a) satisfying the following conditions:
1. Q0(a) = 0
2. Qt(a) = Qt−1(a) + (rt(a))+ where (x)+ = max(0, x)
The regret-like value Qt(a) is then an upper bound on the regret Rt(a) =
∑t
i=1 r
i(a)
Proof.
The lemma and proof closely resembles the similar proofs in [45], [9].
For any t ≥ 1, Qt+1(a) − Qt(a) = Qt(a) + max(rt(a), 0) − Qt ≥ Qt(a) + rt(a) − Qt(a) =
Rt+1(a)−Rt(a)
This gives Qt(a) =
∑t
i=1Q
i(a)−Qi−1(a) ≥∑ti=1Ri(a)−Ri−1(a) = Rt(a)
Lemma 11. Given a set of actions A and any sequence of rewards vt such that |vt(a)− vt(b)| < ∆
for all t and all a, b ∈ A, after playing a sequence of strategies determined by regret matching but
using the regret-like value Qt(a) in place of RT (a), Qt(a) ≤ ∆√2|A|T
Proof. Again, the lemma and proof closely follows from [45], [9].
(maxaQ
t(a))2 = maxaQt(a)2 ≤
∑
aQ
t(a)2
=
∑
a(Q
t−1(a) + (rt(a))+)2
=
∑
a(Q
t−1(a) + (vt(a)−∑b σt(b)vt(b))+)2
≤∑a(Qt−1(a) + (vt(a)−∑b σt(b)vt(b)))2 + ∆2
=
∑
aQ
t−1(a)2 + (vt(a)−∑b σt(b)vt(b))2 + 2Qt−1(a)(vt(a)−∑b σt(b)vt(b)) + ∆2
≤ 2∆2|A|+∑aQt−1(a)2 + 2(∑aQt−1(a)vt(a)−∑a,bQt−1(a)vt(b) Qt−1(b)∑
cQ
t−1(c) )
= 2∆2|A|+∑aQt−1(a)2 + 2(∑aQt−1(a)vt(a)−∑b vt(b)Qt−1(b)∑c σt(c))
= 2∆2|A|+∑aQt−1(a)2
Q0(a) = 0 for all a, so by induction (maxaQt(a))2 ≤ 2T |A|∆2 which gives QT (a) ≤ ∆
√
2|A|T
C.1 Empirical results for RM++
Figure 5a shows that the last iterate of RM++ converges to the equilibrium of rock-paper scissors.
Similar results, not shown, hold for matching pennies. Prior work as shown that both RM and RM+
diverge in these games in terms of the last iterate (although they converge on average). We also
tested RM++ in Soccer, and as the no-regret algorithm for CFR in Kuhn poker and for LONR in
Grid World. In all cases we achieved last iterate convergence.
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(a) RM++
Figure 5: LONR-V current policy trace with RM++ for Rock, Paper, Scissors.
D Omitted Experimental Details
D.1 LONR pseudocode
Here we use standard notation, specifically whereN is the total number of agents, n is current agent,
S and s represent the total states and current state respectively. The notation An(s) provides the set
of actions for player n in state s. A−n(s) denotes the set of actions of all other agents excluding
agent n in state s. a refers to the current agent n when unspecified.
The policy update uses any no-regret algorithm. The update for Regret Matching++ is shown here.
D.2 LONR on GridWorld
This task is a simple deterministic grid world MDP, in particular the cliff walking task used by [47],
illustrated in Figure 6a. As moves have a living cost of 1, we use γ = 1 (The optimal value from
S is therefore -13.) Because of the possibility of revisiting states, and receiving rewards/costs from
non-terminals, CFR is not immediately applicable. Figure 6b and Figure 6c shows the results for
both LONR-V and LONR-A in terms of the Q-value for the start state’s optimal action of North.
LONR-V is deterministic with a single agent, so the plot represents a single run. For LONR-A we
plot the results of 100 runs and their average. In both cases, we see convergence.
D.3 Soccer Game
Here we analyze a simplified version of soccer, originally introduced in [37], and subsequently
widely used as an early benchmark game for multiagent Markov Games. Our implementation differs
slightly in size, but maintains the general rules of the original game.
The soccer game is a two player, grid-style version based on real-life soccer. The size of the grid
(field) is 2x4, where the first and last columns are the areas where each player can score. The 2x2
grid between the goal zones are cells in which the players can move. The game begins with each
player set to a position on the grid, where one player has control of the ball. At each step of the game,
the players each take an action, which are then executed jointly. The defending player is capable of
stealing the ball by landing in the same cell as the player with the ball. If the player controlling the
ball enters either of the goal cells, they receive 100 points and the other player receives -100 points,
thus the game is zero-sum. For additional complexity, the order in which the actions are processed
each iteration is randomized.
We run 2 agents against each other with LONR with each regret minimizer for 1000 games (a game
runs until a player scores). We discount with γ = 0.9 to induce agents to score quickly. Before
each new game, the position of the players (restricted to non-goal areas) is randomized, as well as
who has initial control of the ball. The players then play 1000 games (with initial conditions again
randomized) against each other using their learned policies (in this case, the average policy after
training.) Figure 7 shows the results of the trials. Each regret minimizer shows signs of convergence
in self-play, as indicated by neither player dominating the other (each ends in the average as ties.)
17
Algorithm 1 LONR and Updates
1: procedure LONR-V(T,N, S,An) . Value iteration
2: ∀ n ∈ N, s ∈ S, an ∈ An(s) :
3: Q0(n, s, an)← 0, pi0(n, s, an)← 0
4: RegretSums(n, s, an)← 0, PolicySums(n, s, an)← 0
5:
6: for t from 0 to T do
7: ∀n ∈ N, s ∈ S :
8: Q-Update(n, s, t)
9:
10: ∀n ∈ N, s ∈ S :
11: Policy-Update(n, s, t)
12:
13: procedure Q-UPDATE(n, s, t) . Update Q-Values
14: for each action an ∈ An(s) do
15: successors = getSuccessorStatesAndTransitionProbs(n, s, an, a−n)
16: ActionV alue← 0
17: for s′, transProb, reward in successors do
18: nextStateV alue←∑a′n Qt(n, s′, a′n)× pit(n, s′, a′n)
19: ActionV alue← ActionV alue+ transProb · (reward+ γ · nextStateV alue)
20: Qt+1(n, s, an)← ActionV alue
21:
22: procedure POLICY-UPDATE(n, s, t) . Regret Matching++
23: ExpectedV alue =
∑
an
Qt+1(n, s, an)× pit(n, s, an)
24:
25: for an ∈ An(s) do . RM++ Update Rule
26: immediateRegret← max(0, Qt+1(n, s, an)− ExpectedV alue)
27: RegretSums(n, s, an)← RegretSums(n, s, an) + immediateRegret
28:
29: totalRegretSum =
∑
iRegretSums(n, s, i)
30:
31: for an ∈ An(s) do . Update Policy
32: if totalRegretSum > 0 then
33: pit+1(n, s, an) =
RegretSums(n,s,an)
totalRegretSum
34: else
35: pit+1(n, s, an) =
1
|An(s)|
36:
37: PolicySums(n, s, an)← PolicySums(n, s, an) +pit+1(n, s, an)
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(a) GridWorld: the agent’s goal is to move from S to
the 0 terminal. Each move has a cost of 1 and the
shaded states are terminals with a -100 payoff. This
particular grid world is the cliff walking task use by
Van Seijen et al. [47] to evaluate Expected SARSA. (b) LONR-V on GridWorld
(c) LONR-A on GridWorld
Figure 6: Tasks
Figure 7: Soccer Game
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